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Abstract
The paper explores the differences between IRAP (the Regional Tax
on Productive Activities) and CBIT (the Comprehensive Business Income
Tax), which approximately corresponds to allow the deduction of labor cost
from the taxable base of IRAP. By developing a DSGE model that incor-
porates business taxes, like IRAP or CBIT, we find that tax distortions
due to IRAP are more contractionary than those caused by the presence of
CBIT. Empirically, tax revenues and redistributive effects are more care-
fully analyzed. We implement a microsimulation model (MSM) based on
a dataset of more than 150,000 incorporated firms. We show that small
incorporated firms are particularly harmed by IRAP, especially when busi-
ness run a loss instead of a profit. This is due to the fact that IRAP is a
business tax on value added, which does not allow for the deduction of la-
bor cost. For this purpose, we focus on the introduction of a reform based
on the CBIT principle. Our result is that CBIT is particularly costly and
more able to enhance the profitability for larger enterprises. Moreover,
the tax design of CBIT is more regressive compared to the IRAP includ-
ing tax allowances. Consequently, an efficiency-equity trade-off between
IRAP and CBIT might be emphasized.
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1 Introduction
Integration of markets and demands for greater neutrality in the tax levy
marked the recent evolution of systems of corporate taxation. The strategy
consisting in the reduction in the rate and in the widening the tax base was the
distinctive feature of the reforms implemented since the mid-eighties in almost
all OECD countries following the U.S. Tax Reform Act.
With the increasing international tax competition1, statutory corporate in-
come tax rates were significantly reduced almost everywhere in many countries
by even more than 15 percentage points (e.g., France, Germany, Holland, Portu-
gal, United Kingdom). Although tax rates are still different across EU countries,
recent developments show a trend of convergence towards a European average of
24%. In parallel, to avoid unsustainable falling in revenues, tax bases have been
broadened through a variety of measures, including the abolition of tax expen-
ditures, anti-avoidance regulation and thin capitalisation rules, tax allowances
(i.e. fiscal depreciation schemes) and inventory valuations.
Furthermore, current tax systems in Europe favor debt financing over equity
financing. While, in general, interest on debt is deductible from the corporate
tax base, return on equity is not. This leads to a higher leverage of firms since
financing investments with debt is more attractive. The eighties and nineties
were also marked by a well grounded policy debate on improving efficiency in
corporate taxation by minimising tax distortions between debt and equity fi-
nance and by reducing the cost of capital. The discussion on reforming the
tax system towards achieving financing neutrality has gained even more inter-
est nowadays in light of the current financial crisis and the economic downturn
which highlighted that for many companies the debt ratio is too high. In general
terms, within a marginal framework that places exclusive attention to the effects
of tax system on marginal investments, two different schemes of neutral taxation
1 See OECD [23] Bretschger and Hettich [9] and Devereux et al. [12].
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are conceivable. A first proposal taxes business cash flows without allowing the
deductibility of investment financial costs (whatever the source), but providing
the immediate deductibility of costs incurred for the purchase of capital goods.2
An alternative proposal taxes profits of companies, allowing deductibility of the
cost of financing (whatever the source) but limiting the deductibility of invest-
ment expenses to true economic depreciation. Beside the practical applicability
of the cash flow tax, the debate about the ways of restructuring corporate tax
systems towards debt-equity neutrality has led to a variety of proposals.3 In
principle, two opposing measures exist that might eliminate this distortion by
treating both sources of finance in the same way: a Comprehensive Business
Income Tax (CBIT) or an Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE).
First the CBIT, proposed by U.S. Treasury (U.S. Department of the Treasury
[30]), broadens the tax base by disallowing a deduction for interest payments
on debt. If the tax rate remains unchanged, this leads to an increase in tax
revenue. The additional revenue can be either used for a reduction in the statu-
tory corporate tax rate or of other taxes if the reform is supposed to be revenue
neutral.
On the contrary, the ACE would grant the same deduction for the return
on equity as for interest paid, abolishing the tax advantage of debt (IFS [17]).
Within the corporate profits, ACE distinguishes two components: the first is the
ordinary return on capital invested, that is fully deducted and thereby totally
exempted from taxation; the second is the extra residual profit that is subject
to the normal corporate tax rate. ACE reduces the tax burden on marginal
investment, but also leads to a narrower tax base. In order to collect the same
amount of tax revenue either the statutory corporate tax rate or other taxes
have to be increased to finance such a reform.
2 See Meade Committee [20] and Sinn [27].
3 See Cnossen [10] and De Moij and Devereux[11]
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Italy was a latecomer to the process of reforming corporate taxation.
Since the late ninenties, the Italian business income tax system was subject
to two major reforms after over twenty years where only minor changes to the
regime designed at the beginning of the 1970s were implemented. The first was
introduced in 1997 while the second one came into effect in 2003. Although
both reforms state among their targets simplification of the business tax system
as well as reduction of the firms’ tax burden, the tax policy design underlying
the two regimes is actually different (Giannini [16]).
At a first stage, the move towards a lower rate on profits did follow only
partially both the academic debate discussed extensively in economics and the
traditional tax design in most Western European countries. In the latter, since
the 1980s the corporate tax base was broadened by eliminating a number of
allowances from the profit tax base (i.e. accelerated depreciation). In Italy, in-
stead, the reduction of the tax rate on profits was initially obtained in the late
nineties by extending taxation at the business level to other types of income dif-
ferent from profits, rather than by widening the definition of profit to be used
as tax base. Tax reform introducing IRAP (the regional tax on business activi-
ties) in 1998 was mainly aimed at simplifying and rationalizing the tax system
by reducing the excess burden of taxation, by increasing neutrality of tax levy
with respect to different forms of organising businesses and with respect to the
use of different productive factors, namely capital and labor (profits, interests
and wages are all included in the same tax base and taxed with the same rate),
by rebalancing tax incentives towards equity (instead of debt) financing and by
reducing the incentives for tax avoidance and tax evasion (mostly by small busi-
ness). IRAP dispays the properties of an origin-based, (net) income-type value
added tax (OB-(N) IT-VAT). Since the inclusion of all factors of production in
the tax base at a rather low and competitive statutory tax rate (originally set at
4.25%), IRAP is considered a broad-base and low-rate (BB-LR) local business
tax. Apart from the specific rules established for the banking system, financial
intermediaries and insurance companies, for most business activities IRAP tax
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base is computed by subtraction, as the accounting difference between revenue
from sales and costs of intermediate goods and services. Neither labor costs,
nor interest payments are deductible from the tax base. Thus, the IRAP base
basically equals the sum of wages, profits, rents and interest payments at the
business level and roughly corresponds to the total economy’s net value-added.
With respect to the US tax design of a Comprehensive Business Income Tax,
IRAP is clearly much less radical, even if the underlying rationale does not differ
much. IRAP shares with CBIT the idea of taxing interest payments and goes
even further in widening the tax base, in so far as labour costs are also included.
Overall, the statutory tax rate on profits was reduced by about 10 percentage
points, even if the IRAP tax reform mostly favored firms with higher relief from
health contributions and lower skilled employees (Bordignon et al. [8]; Monte-
duro and Vagliasindi [21]). At the early stage of the introduction of IRAP the
underlying rationale was also to pursue selective tax burden reductions aiming
at narrowing the distortion in the tax treatment of equity finance as compared
to debt, implicit in the previous system. In order to attain this purpose the
main innovation of the 1997 reform was the introduction of the Dual Income
Tax (DIT) allowance, a dual-rate scheme where a lower statutory rate is applied
on that part of business profits representing the opportunity cost of new equity
financing, compared to other forms of capital investment. This system offered
a structural reduction of the company tax burden depending on the amount of
capital increases undertaken by the company, in the form of new subscriptions
and retained earnings as established by the tax code. The dual system for busi-
ness income taxation was somewhat intermediate between the Dual Income Tax
(DIT) system implemented in the Nordic countries in the 1990s (Sørensen [28])
and the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) proposed in the UK by the IFS
[17]. On the other hand, to enhance capital mobility in an international context
and in particular to foster the choice of investment and location made by multi-
national companies (Bond [7] and Devereux and Griffith [12]), the statutory and
the average rate of taxation on profits was reduced.
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At a second stage, following international practice, the reform of the corpo-
rate tax implemented as of January 2004 implied a radical change, being aimed
at reducing the tax burden on corporations, and at introducing a tax system
more in line with the corporate income tax systems in European countries. The
policy design envisaged by the 2003 reform set explicitly that tax instruments
aimed at modifying firms’ financial decision tended to introduce distortions in
firms’ behaviour and, therefore, should be eliminated. Consequently, the re-
form abolished the DIT system and moved back to a uniform tax rate system,
by reducing the corporate tax rate from 36 per cent in 2002 to 33 per cent as
from 2004. Furthermore, the new regime set some changes to the definition of
the corporate tax base by introducing a participation-exemption regime and by
removing the full imputation of dividends, and brought in an optional consol-
idated tax statement for corporate groups, in this way attaining simplification
in the tax base computation. The reform also included provisions for a grad-
ual abolishment of IRAP. Not surprisingly, the evolution in the regional tax on
productive activities raised over time increasing criticisms, and was considered
as an important factor in explaining several distortions and drawbacks of the
Italian system. The main argument were that: i) by not allowing the deduction
of labor costs, it prejudices employment; ii) it is due also when business run
a loss instead of a profit; iii) it is at odds with the ’correspondence’ principle,
because it is levied on business but in practice it finances the national health
system, which accounts for roughly 80 percent of the regional expenditure.
In 2007, social security contributions have been excluded from the tax base,
with the aim of reducing the burden on labour. Since 2008, the standard rate
has been reduced to 3.9 per cent and the tax base calculation has been greatly
simplified, establishing a direct derivation from the P&L account and abolishing
the application of the tax bridge used for determining the CIT taxable base.
In this paper we deal with a comprehensive reform that shifts business tax-
ation from IRAP to CBIT, either using a macroeconomic or a microeconomic
framework of analysis. By developing a DSGE model that incorporates busi-
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ness taxes, like IRAP or CBIT, we find that tax distortions due to IRAP are
more contractionary than those caused by the presence of CBIT. The broad
contraction is leaded by the collapse in employment and, in its turn, by the tax
distortion in the labor market due to the presence of the IRAP; by contrast,
the deduction of the labor cost in presence of a CBIT-type taxation allows a
smaller reduction in employment, thus making the different impact on output
quite considerable.
Empirically, tax revenues and redistributive effects are more carefully ana-
lyzed. We implement a microsimulation model (MSM) based on a dataset of
more than 150,000 incorporated firms. First, we point out the methodologi-
cal techniques; then, we briefly clarify how the tax rules in 2008 and 2009 are
simulated in the microsimulation model. We definitely stress redistributive ef-
fects and loser-winner comparisons. We show that small incorporated firms are
particularly harmed by IRAP, especially when business run a loss instead of a
profit. This is due to the fact that IRAP is a business tax on value added, which
does not allow for the deduction of labor cost. For this purpose, we focus on the
introduction of a reform based on the CBIT principle. Our main result is that
CBIT is particularly costly and more able to enhance the profitability for larger
enterprises. In fact, the basic simulation shows a slight redistributive effect of
IRAP, more probably due to tax allowances. Afterwards, we define two types
of CBIT reform: the first one is the revenue non-neutral reform; the latter is
the revenue neutral reform, in which we simulate the tax rate that allows the
same amount of tax revenues collected in the case of IRAP (with a standard tax
rate equal to 3.9 per cent). The non-neutral reform obviously reduces the tax
incidence; however, this reduction is totally due to the decrease in the average
tax rate. Indeed, we find that the CBIT reform is very regressive as shown
by the negative value of the Kakwani index. Overwhelmingly, it is possible to
observe that a neutral reform would increase the tax incidence too, by soaring
the Reynolds-Smolensky index. Our unequivocal outcome is a regressive effect
of the CBIT reform. The point is that the proportion of labor cost on the
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taxable base is positively-related to the amount of IRAP positive components
(or turnover), for micro enterprises. Thus, the deduction of labor compensation
principally favors larger enterprises. Moreover, we also find that the tax design
of CBIT is more regressive compared to the IRAP by including tax allowances
(current deductions, tax reliefs, tax wedge reductions).
Summing up, while IRAP is more distortionary, as suggested in our macroe-
conomic analysis, CBIT’s unfairness straightforwardly stems from our microsim-
ulations. Consequently, an efficiency-equity trade-off between IRAP and CBIT
might be emphasized.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section dis-
cusses the main theoretical features of IRAP and CBIT. Section 3 describes a
simple thereoretical model for analyzing tax policy issues related to business
taxation in a macroeconomic context. Turning toward a microeconomic frame-
work, in Section 4 we briefly describe the data and sampling procedure. Section
5 shows the results of the microsimulation model, by focusing on the shifting
from IRAP to CBIT. Finally, concluding remarks are laid off in Section 6.
2 Economic Crisis and Tax Distorsions: IRAP vs
CBIT
In September 2008 the collapse of Lehman Brothers opened up grim prospects
for global finance and the world economy. The action of monetary authorities
and government staved off the collapse of confidence among investors and con-
sumers. In the G7 countries as a group, public financial support for the economy
exceeded 5 percentage points of GDP in 2009. Real short term interest rates
turned negative and the central banks provided unprecedented volumes of liq-
uidity. Output declined by 2.4 per cent in US, 4.1% in the euro area, and 5 per
cent in Italy (see Bank of Italy [2]). Government budget deficits and public debt
have spiralled. The roots of the crisis that has beset the world for nearly three
years lie in regulatory and supervisory deficiencies in the main financial centres.
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The expansionary monetary policy conducted by the US from the end of the
1990s helped to create a financial environment conducive to the explosion in
private debt and the aggraviation of global imbalances; clear indications derive
from this for the future, regarding both the system of financial regulation and
monetary policies. In particular, the experience of the crisis also influences the
design of monetary policies. Their objective continues to be price stability, but
they must be more prepared to counter developments in credit and money that
can fuel financial disequilibria, even in the absence of immediate inflationary
dangers.4 Euro-area monetary policy has been strongly expansionary for some
time. But in the last few months the consequences of the crisis have tested
the cohesion of the euro area. The massive creation of public debt suddenly
increased the risk premium on some sovereign debtors (e.g. the Greek crisis).
In Italy, in the two years 2008-09 GDP contracted by 6.3% per cent, almost
half the entire growth achieved in the ten preceding years. Households’ real
income diminished by 3.4 per cent, their consumption by 2.5 per cent. Exports
fell by 22 per cent. Rapidly spreading uncertainty and the deteriorating outlook
for demand led firms to cut investment, causing it to contract by 16 per cent.
Employment decreased by 1.4 per cent, the number of hours worked by 3.7 per
cent (see Bank of Italy [2]). Economic policy limited the damage, containing the
fall in GDP by an estimated two percentage points, of which about one point can
be attributed to monetary policy, half a point to the automatic stabilizers built
into the budget and the rest to the recomposition of revenue and expenditure
enacted by the Government. However, in Italy the increase in the budget deficit
was smaller than in the other main advanced economies, thanks in part to the
solidity of the banking system, which did not need significant public support.
Yet, the ratio of public debt to GDP declined by 18 percentage points between
1994 and 2007. In the last two years of recession it increased by 12 points, to
stand at 115.8 per cent.
Economic crisis put economists and policy makers up against the fall in em-
4See, among the others, Blanchard et al. [6].
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ployment and the risk of a jobless recovery. Growth is slowing, the economy
might go into a doble dip depression with unemployment rates rising again.
Tax distortions in labor market are becoming crucially important and call for
relevant reforms in labor market. The renewed interest in reforming corporate
tax systems in the direction of the comprehensive business income tax (CBIT)
aims at neutralising the distortionary effect of the regional tax on productive ac-
tivity on employment, productivity and investments of companies, by reducing
tax wedge on labor. A solution would be to eliminate discrimination by imple-
menting a reform that cuts labor costs from IRAP tax base shifting towards a
Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT). Indeed, a potential disadvantage
of CBIT is that its narrower tax base reduces corporate tax revenue, and thus
requires higher tax rates to yield the same revenue. By contrast, CBIT disallows
the exemption of interest. It turns the corporate income tax into a broad-base
tax on capital at the level of the firm. This raises the overall cost of capital
so that investment declines. The broadening of the base under CBIT will raise
corporate tax revenue and, if revenue is to be maintained, allows for a higher
corporate tax rate with respect to IRAP.
The first-order conditions that characterize firms’ optimal decisions can pro-
vide some intuitions for understanding the effects of shifting taxation from IRAP
to CBIT. Using a standard model with Cobb Douglas production functions, the
first-order conditions for capital and labor are displayed on the Table below.
Both systems aim to neutralise the distortionary effect of corporate taxes on
the financial structure of companies. In IRAP tax scheme, at the optimal point
where profits are maximised, tax rates are cancelled out so indicating the neu-
trality of taxation with respect to the firms’ marginal choices of production
factors. Furthermore, maximization of profits for firms under the Comprehen-
sive Business Income Tax (CBIT) implies that, for a given interest rate, the tax
cut in employers’ labour costs decreases the marginal product of labour. Tax
rates on capital do not alter factors marginal products, while labour costs have
a direct effect.
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Capital Market Labor Market
IRAP f
′
k (Kt−1, Lt) = ρt
(1−τc)
(1−τc−τIRAP ) f
′
l (Kt−1, Lt) =Wt
(1−τc)
(1−τc−τIRAP )
CBIT f
′
k (Kt−1, Lt) = ρt
(1−τc)
(1−τc−τCBIT ) f
′
l (Kt−1, Lt) =Wt
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Tax Neutrality 
Sources of Finance 
Tax Neutrality 
Investment Choices
Neutrality of
Inflation 
IRAP √   
CBIT √   
ACE √ √  
CASH FLOW √ √ √ 
 
 
The tables above compare the trade-offs in IRAP and CBIT reform, and
all together including ACE and cash-flow tax scheme. Economists typically
favour ACE. This system grants equity holders a certain allowance equal to a
notional risk-free return and turns out to be attractive as it reduces the effective
marginal tax rate to zero, implying that ACE is a tax on economic rent. As
such, it does not distort decisions about the scale of investment, though even a
tax on economic rent can affect discrete investment choices that depend on an
effective average tax rate. A lower rate will typically not be sufficient to prevent
a rise in the effective marginal tax rate, which is why CBIT has not gained
the same popularity as ACE. Both IRAP or CBIT systems are neutral with
respect to marginal investment decisions, since financing investments through
debt is not tax-favoured. Furthermore CBIT allows for a deduction of labor
costs. Shifting from IRAP to CBIT would reduce the distortion on the labor
market thus making companies less vulnerable during economic downturns.
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3 A Theoretical Macroeconomic Framework
This section outlines a simple theoretical framework for analyzing tax policy
issues related to different kinds of the business taxation in a macroeconomic
context. More precisely, by considering a negative demand shock that hits the
economy, the aim of this section is to evaluate the dynamic behavior of the main
aggregate variables, like labor, capital and output, in two different cases: in the
first case an origin-based value-added tax (OB-VAT), like IRAP (Regional Tax
on Productive Activities), is explicitly incorporated in the model; in the second
one IRAP is replaced by a taxation ispired to the Comprehensive Business
Income Taxation (CBIT) that does not include the labor cost in the taxable
base. We think that this investigation is very challenging and attractive for at
least two reasons: from the one side, the business tax is seldom considered in
macroeconomic models; from the other side, by facing an economic crisis, i.e. a
negative aggregate demand shock, it is relevant to question how proper is a tax
distortion in the labor market. Our simple theoretical strategy is the following:
first, we develop a simple macroeconomic model in a New Keynesian Framework
that includes several features developed by the more recent literature; second, we
calibrate the deep parameters of our model according to the standard literature,
except for tax rates, where we apply the Italian coefficients; third, we analyze the
impulse-response functions to consumption and investment (negative) shocks;
finally, we compare IRAP to CBIT and evaluate the main differences.
3.1 A DSGE New Keynesian Model
We follow Galì et al. [15] in order to take into account both the nomi-
nal rigidities and the empirical evidences that seem to confirm a non-negligible
presence of non-Ricardian consumers.5 The model is able to consider both
the capital adjustment costs and the imperfect competition in the intermedi-
5 See, among the others, Di Bartolomeo et al. [13].
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ate goods. Monetary policy follows the Taylor principle, but only cares the
inflation target; fiscal policy is explicitly considered under the assumption of
non-explosive debt dynamics, like in Galì et al. [15]. More in detail, a contin-
uum of infinitely-lived heterogeneous agents normalized to one is assumed. A
fraction (1 − λ) of them consumes and accumulates wealth as in the standard
setup (Ricardian Consumers or Optimizers). The remaining fraction λ is com-
posed by agents who do not own any asset, cannot smooth consumption and,
therefore, consume all their current disposable income (Non-Ricardian or Rule-
of Thumb Consumers). We refer to Optimizers by superscript o, while Rule-of
Thumb Consumers are pointed by the superscript r. Each consumer is assumed
to maximize an optimization problem given by:
[1] Max
Ct, Kt, Nt, Bt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
1
1−σ
(
CjtL
jv
t
)1−σ]
s.t. Pt
(
Cjt + ψI
j
t
)
+ ψBt =
[
WtN
j
t + ψ
(
RKt Kt +Dt
)] (
1− τPt
)
+
+ψ
[
Bt−1Rt−1 − PtT t
]
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + φ
(
It
Kt−1
)
Kt−1
where j = {r, o} , and ψ = 0 if j = r, ψ = 1 if j = o. Ct, Lt, Nt, It and Dt
represent consumption, leisure, labor, capital, investment and nominal dividends
from ownership of firms, respectively, at time t. Pt is the general index of
prices, RKt is the nominal return of capital and Wt the nominal wage; Bt is
the quantity of nominally risk-less bonds that pay Rt of money at maturity,
i.e. the nominal interest rate; β is the subjective discount factor and σ the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution; T t is a lump-sum tax that burdens
the Ricardians’ budget constraint; τPt is the personal income tax rate. The
capital accumulation reflects the convexity of capital adjustment costs, which
determines the change in the capital stock (gross of depreciation) induced by
investment spending.
Each firm h-th sets a price at each period to maximize its profits by consid-
ering its production function. Taking the wage and rental cost as given, profit
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maximization is as follows:
[2] Max
Kt−1,h, Nt,h
Πt,h =
(
Pt,hYt,h −WtNt,h −RKt Kt−1,h
) (
1− τCt
)
+
−ζ (Pt,hYt,h − δPt−1,hKt−1,h) τ irapt +
− (1− ζ) (Pt,hYt,h −WtNt,h − δPt−1Kt−1,h) τcbitt
s.t. Yt,h = Kαt−1,hN
1−α
t,h
Pt,h =
(
Yt,h
Yt
)− 1

Pt
Differently from Galì et al. (2007), we introduce distortionary taxes. In
detail, we consider the taxation at the corporate and business level: τCt is the
corporate income tax rate; τ irapt represents the tax rate of IRAP (acronym of
regional tax on productive activities), while τ cbitt is the tax rate of Comprehen-
sive Business Income Taxation. ζ is equal to 1 in the case of IRAP, 0 in the
case of CBIT. We may capture the degree of monopoly power of each firm by
the elasticity of substitution . The technology is represented by a standard
Cobb-Douglas function, where Yt is the aggregate output produced at time t,
while Yt,h is the real output produced by the firm h-th. The tax base of IRAP
is constituted by the net value added (δ is the depreciation rate); compared to
IRAP, the tax base of CBIT encompasses the deduction of the labor cost. The
derivation of the stationary state is quite similar to Galì et al. [15], Di Bar-
tolomeo et al. [13] and Di Bartolomeo and Manzo [14]. The steady-state level
of employment is determined as illustred in the Appendix A1. Tax revenues are
defined in the following equation:
[3] PtTt = PtT t +
(
WtNt +RKt Kt +Dt
)
τPt +Dt
τCt
(1−τCt )
+
+ζ
(
Pt,hYt,h − δKt−1,h
) τirapt
(1−τCt )
+
+ (1− ζ) (Pt,hYt,h −WtNt − δKt−1,h) τcbitt(1−τCt )
We can assume exogenous tax rates or exogenous government expenditure,
depending upon our choice. We focus on business taxes (τ̂ irapt , τ̂ cbitt ), whose
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rates automatically change in order to allow the convergence of budget con-
straint; by contrast, we fix the value of tax rates at the personal and corporate
level (τ̂Pt , τ̂Ct ); lump-sum taxes are also kept constant. This assumption is not
only due to the fact that our interest is strictly focused on business taxes, but
also to the empirical evidence that tax rates of IRAP automatically vary in
order to balance the regional debt, in Italy. Consequently to our hypotheses,
the coefficent values of IRAP or CBIT tax rates are endogenously determined.
The linearization of the first order conditions allows us to define the model that
describes the short run dynamics around the steady state and to verify if the
conditions for equilibrium determinacy hold. We can combine the log-linearized
equilibrium conditions and, hence, derive the system of difference equations de-
scribing the business cycle, composed by 16 equations in 16 unknown variables
(yt, ct, it, gt, kt, nt, qt, (wt − pt), (rKt − pt), rt, pit, µ̂t, tt,bt, dt, τ̂ irapt or τ̂ cbitt ),
as reported in the Appendix A2.
3.2 Calibration
Each periosd is assumed to correspond to a quarter. We calibrate the model
according to the baseline parametrization in Galì et al. [15]. So, with regard
to preference parameters, we set the discount factor β equal to 0.99 and  to
6, a value consistent with a steady state markup of 20 percent. The rate of
depreciation is set to 0.025; the elasticity of output with respect to capital is
assumed to be one third, a value roughly consistent with income share given the
assumed low steady state price markup. Following the literature, our baseline
setting for the weight of rule-of-thumb consumers λ is 0.5. There are several
estimations of this coefficient for Italy, but there are different ways to define the
participation in the capital market, whether considering or not the real estate.
In order to rule out this inconvenient, for simplicity, we assume the standard
parameter, which is in the range of estimated values in literature of the weight
of rule-of-thumb behavior (Mankiw [19]). The fraction of firms that keep their
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prices unchanged is given by a baseline value of 0.75, which corresponds to an
average price duration of one year. We set the value of v in the utility function,
the cost of working, in such a way that the steady state level of labor is equal
to eight hours in a day.
The policy parameters are chosen as follows. We set the size of the response
of the monetary authority to inflation to 1.5, a value commonly used in empirical
Taylor rules (and one that satisfies the so-called Taylor principle). For the two
parameters describing the fiscal rule (equation [A2.12]) we use the information
provided by results obtained in Bohn [4], Blanchard and Perotti [5] and Galì
et al. [15]. Therefore φb is equal to 0.30, φg is equal to 0.12, while sg, which
corresponds to the government spending share, is fixed at 20 per cent.
Tax rates are calibrated according to the empirical evidence in Italian micro-
data. Thus, τP is equal to the average tax rate at the personal rate and equal
to 22.9% according to Italian Tax Files; τ irap is equal to the average tax rate
for incorporated firms and equal to 4.12%; τ cbit is fixed under the condition to
guarantee the same amount of tax revenues of IRAP. This value is estimated at
7.45% by using the micro-simulation model described in Section 5; finally, τC
is equal to 27.5%.
3.3 Negative Demand Shocks and Business Cycle
The goal of our model is not to accurately replicate the entity of the economic
crisis in terms of the main aggregate variables, consistently with the figures
above described, but, more properly, to investigate the role of distortionary
taxation in a dynamic general economy hit by a negative demand shock. In
fact, we may interpret negative shocks on consumption and the Tobin’s Q as
a collapse of confidence among investors and consumers. Hence, we perturb
the economy by considering two types of shocks: a negative shock that involves
the expected pattern of consumption described by the Euler Equation; another
negative shock that affects the expected value of Tobin’s Q and, consequently,
the dynamic path of investment. In other terms, economic crisis can be viewed
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as a crisis on private expectations on consumption and investment. The role of
the Central Bank, in our model, is to avoid the endogenous fluctuations leaded
by self-fulfilling prophecies. According to our calibration, animal spirits are
effectively prevented by a monetary policy that follows the Taylor principle; the
weight of non-Ricardian consumers is not enough to foster sunspot equilibria.
In such a way, the role of tax policy is not to support the Central Bank in
stabilizing the economy, rather avoiding the explosion of the public debt.
Therefore, tax policy is oriented to alleviate the public deficit. As we con-
sider proportional taxes at the personal and corporate level, a decline in output
triggers a corresponding decline in tax revenues. Moreover, we exogenously as-
sume, as illustred in the Appendix A2, an inertia in government spending in
nominal terms; hence, a wave of deflation is faced by an increase in government
spending. It is worth noticing that tax policy is built to partially respond to the
increase in public spending and debt, according to equation [A2.12]. Specifically,
in our model the only way to increase tax revenues is to hike up business tax
rates, IRAP or CBIT. We are concentrated on analyzing the difference between
CBIT and IRAP. We can distinguish two types of tax distortions: first, the
IRAP distorts the labor market, by shifting downward the labor demand (see
equation [A2.5]); second, the tax rate of CBIT is larger than that of IRAP, hence
the capital demand is more affected by tax hikes (equation [A2.6]). A trede-off
can be emphasized: from the one hand, the labor market is more distorted by
IRAP; on the other hand, the capital market is more distorted by CBIT. How-
ever, while the tax distortion on the capital allocation is quantitatively different
between the case of IRAP and the case of CBIT, the tax distortion on labor is
displayed only in the case of IRAP (i.e. labor market does not imply inefficiency
whereas a business tax is designed as a CBIT).
For this purpose, we compare the impulse-response functions in the two
cases. We depict the dynamic behavior of the main variables in Figure 1. Panel
a) describes the dynamic behavior of output and labor. This picture clearly
illustrates the more recessionary impact of IRAP with respect to CBIT. The
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broad contraction is leaded by the collapse in employment and, in its turn,
by the tax distortion in the labor market due to the presence of the IRAP;
the deduction of the labor cost in presence of a CBIT-type taxation allows a
smaller reduction in labor. The different impact on output is quite considerable,
especially in the medium run. The hump-shaped dynamic of output is very
prominent in the case of IRAP. After six quarters, the annual growth rate of real
GDP is equal to -1.57 per cent in the case of IRAP and -1.06 per cent in the case
of CBIT. The convergence toward the steady state level of employment is rapid
in presence of CBIT. By contrast, Panel b) shows that the fall in investment
(14.7 per cent in the first year) is larger when a CBIT is considered; this is due
to the broader tax distortion in capital market, as shown in Panel c) as well.
The decrease in consumption is suddenly very high in the case of IRAP. The
rationale of this phenomenon is strictly connected with the presence of non-
Ricardian households, whose consumption hinges upon the level of aggregate
wages. The deflationary pressure in real wages is smaller in presence of a CBIT,
while the return of capital plummets compared to the case of IRAP. Panel
e) shows the rise in the tax rates necessary to guarantee the same amount of
tax revenues, whose dynamic is reported in Panel f) together with government
spending and public debt.
Summarizing, from a macroeconomic point of view the business taxation
ispired to the CBIT principle is less distortionary rather than IRAP. This is
clearly due to the tax distortion in the labor market since IRAP does not allow
the deduction of labor cost from the tax base.
4 The Empirical Microeconomic Framework
At this stage of the analysis, we turn our attention on the empirical evidences
and stylized facts that concern tax revenues and redistributive effects related to
IRAP. The main objective is to analyze the impacts of a business tax reform
that eliminates the labor cost from the tax base. Before discussing the main
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features of the microsimulation model, it is important to outline the benefits
and problems of linking micro and macro models. In general, microsimulation
modesl (MSMs) are tools which are designed to answer “what if” questions about
different policy reform options. In the run-up of the implementation of a specific
reform proposal, it is crucial to predict the expected consequences to provide
policy-makers with well-founded decision guidance.
The complexity of macroeconomics requires the usage of simplified models
for the evaluation of reform proposals. Theoretical models allow to point out a
single argument in a semplified framework and to construct hypotheses which
can be tested empirically. Conversely, empirical models allow for an econometric
evaluation of a given reform and are especially useful whenever the magnitude,
and thus not only the sign, of the effects are to be estimated. If the reform
already has been implemeted (and data is available) an ex-post analysis is pos-
sible using standard econometric procedures. On the other hand, if the reform
has not been implemented, only simulation models can provide information for
an ex-ante analysis of different reform proposals. Therefore, in our context the
reform of IRAP can be analyzed by using MSMs.
Despite of the increasing interest for microsimulation models in analyzing
tax policy reforms and redistributive effects, the empirical literature principally
focuses on the personal income taxation. To the best of our knowledge, analyses
at the corporate level are much less developed. Fiscal policy evaluations on the
firms’ side is concentrated on behavioral analyses through econometric tools and
longitudinal data. This is more likely for a twofold reason: first, tax distortion
is often studied in models that regress investment on the user cost of capital;
second, the impact of tax policy on firms’ productivity growth rate requires the
usage of dynamic models that are founded on panel data.
By contrast, microsimulation models are built for different purposes; the
analysis is conducted ceteris paribus in the sense that MSMs do not investigate
impulse-responses behaviors; otherwise, the interest is usually restricted to the
tax revenue impact or redistributive effects. The idea of policy evaluation is
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quite simple. Given a baseline tax system these models allow estimating the ef-
fects of a policy reform by simulating numerically the tax-benefit system before
and after the policy intervention. In such a way, MSMs may help understand-
ing who gains and who loses from a new policy reform. In Italy, an impor-
tant point of reference for MSMs at the corporate level is represented by the
project named DIECOFIS (Development of a system of Indicators on Economic
COmptetiveness and FIScal impact on enterprise performance) financed by the
programme IST (Information Society Technology) of the European Commission
and co-ordinated by ISTAT. More precisely, the CTM (Corporate Tax Model)
is based on an integrated dataset which combines micro-data of the ISTAT-SCI
(the Italian acronym is Sistema dei Conti delle Imprese) survey and accounts
micro-data from the Chamber of Commerce.6 Frequently, an important hurdle
difficult to overcome in these models is to single out tax credits and incentives.7
Within the DIECOFIS project some modules are explicitly developed for the
simulation of IRAP, social contributions and excise taxes.
However, our model is totally focused on IRAP. In addition, our model
differentiates from the previous ones for the utilized sample. The sample is
drawn from tax revenues declared by incorporated firms in 2008 (fiscal year
2007). Hence, the data refer more on tax declarations than P&L accounts
provided by Chamber of Commerce. Anyhow, we try to integrate tax data with
P&L accounts available in CERVED (provided by Chamber of Commerce). Such
a data integration allows us to take account of some relevant discrepancies. The
empirical strategy is as follows: next section sketchs out the methodological
techniques; then, we briefly discuss the tax rules simulated in the model; finally,
results are carried forward beginning from the basic formulation of IRAP to
conclude with the tax reform proposal concerning the CBIT. We definitely stress
redistributive effects and loser-winner comparisons.
6This integration is necessarily due to the fact that for tax modelling purposes in some
cases variables in the accounts are defined at a more disaggregated level, and therefore it
allows for a more accurate simulation of the tax rules (see Oropallo and Parisi [24]).
7See Bardazzi et al. [3].
20
4.1 Data and Sampling Method
The source of data used in the model is constituted by a stratified sample
drawn from the tax declarations of incorporated firms in the fiscal year 2007.
The stratified sampling is used when a representative unit (firm) from each
subgroup (firm’s size) within the population (incorporated firms) need to be
represented in the sample. The first step in stratified sampling is to divide the
population into subgroups (strata) based on mutually exclusive criteria. Ran-
dom samples are then taken from each subgroup. A procedure for allocation
of sample sizes to different strata consists of drawing a preliminary sample of
fixed size from each stratum to estimate the strata variances and test their ho-
mogeneity. If the strata variances are found homogeneous, the sample sizes to
be drawn from different strata are allocated according to proportional alloca-
tion; otherwise, they are allocated according a modified proportional allocation
stratified sampling (modified PASS). Differently from data of households or in-
dividual taxpayers, the sampling design of firms is better implemented in the
modified proportional allocation.8 Accordingly, the sampling fraction is fixed
in 1/7 = 0.143. Such a fraction assures a representative sample size, but it is
modified in order to take care of larger enterprises, where most of the variability
is concentrated. For this purpose, data includes incorporated firms that declare
positive components in the tax base of IRAP higher than 25 millions of euro.
The variables of stratification are: i) 20 regions; ii) 35 ATECO sectors 9 iii) 4
classes of positive IRAP components.10 Population is represented by more than
830, 000 incorporated firms; the sample size corresponds to 151, 419 firms. A
sample weight is associated to each unit to derive population estimates from the
survey sample and can be written as whij =
Nhij
nhij
, where Nhij is the population
8 In fact, the variance is very high and a weighted allocation would require a more complex
study in order to specify the variables that may explain the latent characteristics.
9 The Italian Istitute of Statistics (ISTAT) elaborates the ATECO classification from the
list of NACE codes, i.e. an European industry standard classification system consisting of a
6 digit code.
10 The first class refers to firms with less than 2 millions of euro; the second one between 2
and 10 millions of euro; the third one between 10 and 25 millions of euro; the last one more
than 25 millions of euro.
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number and nhij is the sample size.11 Table 1 and 2 show the performance of the
sample dataset in terms of percentage errors as regards to positive components
of IRAP by sectors and regions, respectively. On average the difference is equal
to three percentage points. The data have been cleaned for obvious keypunch
and filling errors. Especially, it is worth reviewing the reported values in the
Section XI concerning the amount of deductions for labor costs.
5 Microsimulations and Results
Given that we are interested in evaluating the impact of IRAP in 2009,
we need to update the values reported in the fiscal year 2007. The updating
procedure takes into account the nominal growth rate of value added by each
sector according to the forecasts provided by PROMETEIA [25]. The Forecast
Report published by PROMETEIA provides complete and detailed analysis of
microsectors in the Italian economy. The analysis has been integrated with
the quarterly forecasts carried out by ISTAT, particularly in order to update
variables related to the number of employees, nominal wages and social security
contributions. Moreover, other variables has been updated by using the nominal
groth rate of GDP reported by the Forecast and Planning Report for 2008
and 2009 (The Treasury Department, Ministry of Economy and Finance [29]).
Finally, the amount of interest payments have been updated by applying the
growth rate of loans as reported by the Supplements to the Statistical Bulletin
- Money and Banking - (Bank of Italy [1]). The next step consists of simulating
the tax rules for 2008 and 2009.
The Regional Tax on Productive Activities (IRAP) was introduced by Leg-
islative Decree No. 446 of December 15, 1997 as an implementation of the
delegation provided by the 1997 Financial Act. Along with the introduction of
IRAP, the following taxes and contributions were abolished: i) National Health
11 h refers to regions, i to sectors and j to positive components of IRAP. Obviously, for the
firms with positive components higher than 25 millions of euro the sample weight is equal to
one.
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Service Contributions; ii) Local Income Tax (ILOR); iii) Municipal Tax on
Productive, Artistic and Professional Activity (ICIAP); iv) Tax on State Con-
cessions for VAT positions; v) Net Worth Tax on Enterprises. The purpose of
this tax is to simplify the tax system by reducing the number of taxes applicable
and to start the process of regional tax autonomy. IRAP is a regional tax on net
production deriving from the activity carried out on the territory of a region.
The tax applies to the net production attributable to the activity carried out
in the territory of the region. If the activity is carried out in the territory of
several regions, the net production value must be proportionally split among
the regions where the activity is carried out, by considering, as a general rule,
the amount of compensation due to all personnel. To this regard, some specific
rules apply for banks, financial companies, insurance companies and farming
enterprises.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of IRAP by headquarters or plants. It is
worth noting that IRAP does reasonably well in terms of geographical distribu-
tions. One of the arguments in favor of IRAP as a good local tax is that the tax
base is well apportionated among regions. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2,
the distribution favors the depressed areas of the Mezzogiorno, such as Puglia,
Molise, Calabria and Sicilia.
The statutory IRAP rate was 4.25 per cent. For most enterprises, the taxable
base must be calculated starting from the profit and loss account. Nevertheless,
some different temporary rates were foreseen depending on the kind of activity
(banking, insurance and farming entities). The determination of the production
value varies depending on the nature of the taxpayer (banks, insurance com-
panies, manufacturing companies, etc.) and on the adopted accounting regime.
Only in 2000 regions could start using the faculty of maneuvering the tax rate,
by differentiating the rate among economic sectors and categories of taxpay-
ers. In addition, the Decree set forth the general rules applicable to all parties
and established whether or not some costs are deductible for IRAP purposes.
Generally, the following items are not deductible: costs relating to employed
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personnel; compensation for independent collaborations which are not carried
out on a regular basis; costs for personnel employed on an ongoing and co-
ordinated basis; compensations for services treated as subordinate employment;
profits allocated to associated in participation contributing only by work; the
part of financial leasing attributable to interests payable. It is worth noting
that the general rule adopts an accrual, and not a cash, principle. On the other
hand, the following items are deductible: contributions for compulsory accident
insurance in the work place; trainee and apprentice expenses; expenses for the
personnel hired with apprentice employment contracts. In order to determine
the taxable base, it is necessary to take into consideration the accounting items
relevant for civil law purposes, along with the above-mentioned exclusions and
exceptions. These items have to be adjusted according to the tax provisions
applicable for income tax purposes. The taxable base varies depending on the
activity carried out by the taxpayer.
5.1 The Baseline Simulation (IRAP-MSM)
The Italian Finance Bill for 2008 (Law no. 244 of 24 December 2007) envis-
aged several changes to the Italian tax system. In our basic simulation we take
account of four relevant changes and we neglect all others: the changes in the
tax treatment of depreciation, such as the reform of the corporate income tax-
ation (IRES); the reduction in the tax rate; the new formulation of deductions;
the different tax treatment of interest expenses.
As a general rule, depreciation is deducted under a straight line method on
the basis of depreciation rates and schedules approved by the tax administra-
tion for different classes of assets. Previous law allowed accelerated deprecia-
tion, equal to two times the ordinary depreciation rates in the first three years
of purchase of new assets or in the first year of purchase of used assets, and
extraordinary depreciation based on a particularly intense use of the assets (de-
termined on a case by case basis). The new rules repeal both the accelerated and
extraordinary depreciation and a substitute tax (ranging from 12 per cent to 16
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per cent rate) may be paid in order to obtain tax relief for differences between
book and tax values. In other terms, the tax base calculation has been greatly
simplified by establishing a direct derivation from the P&L account and abol-
ishing the application of the tax bridge used for determining the CIT taxable
base. By using data available for 2007, before the outset of the reform, a rigor-
ous computation of the abolition of extraordinary and accelerated depreciation
is quite difficult to simulate. For this reason, we make the simple assumption to
keep exclusively the values reported as direct derivation from the P&L account
without considering the variations necessary to derive the amounts for IRAP
purposes (coherently with the compilation of the form that concerns the excess
costs - the so-called quadro EC ). We only correct these values by a small per-
centage (equal to 1.2 per cent), which we compute in order to fit the trend of
tax revenues in 2009. We uniformly apply the average percentage of correction
to all firms.
Second, the 2008 budget reformed the structure of the tax system (Legisla-
tive Decree No. 344/2003), reducing corporate income tax (IRES) rate by 5.5
nominal points from 33 to 27.5 percent, and trimming the regional business tax
(IRAP) by a coefficient equal to 0.9176, from 4.35 to 3.9 percent for the standard
tax rate. Specifically for the farm sector the tax rate remains unchanged at 1.9
per cent. These tax cuts are in response to increased EU-wide competition for
investment, particularly as the enlargement of the EU to 27 members ushered
in various low cost, low tax East European states. Germany’s 2007 decision to
cut corporate tax rates by ten points rendered Italy’s corporate tax rate the
highest in the EU. Both the tax reforms are inspired to the law rate - broad base
principle.
A third important reform was concentrated on the tax wedge reduction. It
consisted of two parts. First, employers’ social security contributions may be
now deducted from the taxable base.12 Second, a lump sum equal to 5, 000 euro
(raised to 10, 000 euro for the regions Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania,
12 Then, this measure has been extended to banks, financial firms and insurances.
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Molise, Puglia, Sardegna and Sicilia) for each employee on permanent contract
will be granted at 50% starting from the month of February 2007, and in their
entirety starting from the month of July 2007, on an annual pro-rata basis.13
The measure aimed at favouring job creation by reducing the labor costs borne
by companies, through IRAP deductions, particularly in the southern regions of
Italy where the rate of unemployment is still relatively high compared to other
parts of Italy. The reform implemented in 2008 reduced the lump-sum from
5, 000 euro to 4, 200 euro and from 10, 000 euro to 9, 200 euro for companies
located in particularly depressed areas of the Mezzogiorno. We reckon the num-
ber of employees according to a backward (a ritroso) procedure, which consists
of applying the tax rule in vigour in 2007 to the reported value of deductions.
Then, the tax rules in 2008 and 2009 are applied to the number of employees
estimated for the 2007.14 We also simulate both the further deduction, which is
a decreasing function of the tax base up to 180, 999.91 euro, and the tax relief
for each employee up to a maximum of five and to 20, 000 euro for each newly
job created in each of the fiscal years 2005 to 2008.
Moreover, the model simulates the special treatment of interest expenses,
which are deductible by 4 per cent in 2008 and 3 per cent in 2009. Finally,
beginning from 2008 a share of 10 per cent of IRAP can be deducted for IRES
purposes. We define the basic simulation as the IRAP - MicroSimulation Model
(IRAP-MSM). Then, various simulations require supplementary and substitute
modules that we are going to describe in next sub-sections. Table 3 and 4 show
the performance of IRAP-MSM compared to the model implemented by Finance
Department (DF Model), which is based on the universe of incorporated firms.
Except for fishing15 and other not-elsewhere-classified economic activities, the
13 For the purposes of our simulation we consider a coefficient equal to 70.23% in order to
update the entity really deducted in 2007.
14 The number of employees is opportunely updated according to growth rates of the em-
ployment estimated by ISTAT for each sector.
15 We remind that ISTAT aggregates Agriculture and Hunting with Fishing; thereby, some
discrepancies could derive by this approximation.
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percentage gap is quite small for each sector.
At a glance we emphasize how IRAP burdens firms by size and turnover.
We draw the attention on the main criticisms that characterize IRAP. Given
that IRAP also taxes labor compensation, it is commonly view as prejudicing
employment; second, since it is also due when business run a loss instead of
a profit, it has met the strong opposition of the taxpayers. Mostly, micro and
small enterprises16 perceive the unfairness and the oppression of the tax system.
To the extent that IRAP does not allow the deduction of labor costs, the tax
distortion principally affects micro and small enterprises, whose profits are not
enough to compensate the amount of labor compensation. As a consequence,
we can observe in Figure 3 that there are almost 8.3 per cent of loss firms17 that
pay IRAP; 83 per cent of them is represented by micro enterprises. In Equation
[5], we outline an indicator of tax oppression in the following manner:
[5] I = IRAP+LossTB+Loss
where IRAP is the amount of the taxation, Loss is the amount of the losses
for the CIT/IRES purposes, TB is the taxable base. If losses are equal to zero
the indicator I becomes equal to the tax rate. The denominator is equal to the
sum of labor compensation, interests payments and profits (without considering
losses); the numerator is a sort of an economic burden constituted by tax burden
and economic losses. Figure 4 shows that the economic burden is particularly
high for micro enterprises.
16 Our classification of firm’s size originates from the European Commission’s definition and
it is the following: i) micro firms if the IRAP positive components are less than 2 millions of
euro; ii) small firms if the IRAP positive components are higher than 2 millions of euro and
at most equal to 10 millions of euro; iii) medium firms if the IRAP positive components are
higher 10 millions of euro and at most equal to 50 millions of euro; iv) large firms if the IRAP
positive components are higher than 50 millions of euro.
17 We define “loss firms” the incorporated firms that declare positive losses for the CIT
(IRES) purposes.
27
5.2 Introducing a Comprehensive Business Income Taxa-
tion (CBIT)
We have shown that micro and small incorporated firms are particularly
harmed by IRAP, especially when business run a loss instead of a profit. This
is due to the fact that IRAP is a business tax on value added, which does not
allow for the deduction of labor cost. For this purpose, we now focus on the
introduction of a reform based on the Comprehensive Business Income Taxation
(CBIT) principle. In Figure 5 we have simulated the ripartition of the taxable
base of IRAP for 2009 by distinguishing among labor cost, earnings and interest
payments. The labor cost represents the great majority, almost two third of
the taxable base. We observe that in 2009 the share of earnings diminished
compared to 2008 because of the impact of the economic crisis. The intuition
suggests that the introduction of CBIT is costly in terms of tax revenues. In
order to simulate the replace of IRAP with CBIT, we substitute the module of
IRAP-MSM describing the tax rule in vigour in 2009 with a new module that
replicates the deduction of labor costs. However, we also do not consider in the
reform proposal the current tax allowances (tax wedge, further deduction, tax
reliefs etc...). In other words, we trade all the tax allowances with the entire
amount of labor compensation. We define two types of CBIT reform: the first
one is the revenue non-neutral reform; the latter is the revenue neutral reform,
in which we simulate the tax rate that allows the same amount of tax revenues
collected in the case of IRAP with a standard tax rate of 3.9 per cent.
Figure 6 summarizes the results. As expected, the non-neutral reform is par-
ticularly costly, almost 7.8 billions of euro. Almost 33, 000 enterprises becomes
exempts after the reform, 23, 000 of them are small firms. The non-neutral re-
form requires a standard tax rate equals to 7.05 per cent; yet, the increase in the
tax rate does not significantly affect the number of exempt firms. We also are
interested in the impact of the reform. The redistributive effects can be mea-
sured by following a standard approach that consists in decomposing the overall
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redistribution effects into two components: a progressivity effect (or departure
from proportionality) and a measure of tax incidence.18 The degree of progres-
sivity (DP ) is captured by the Kakwani index (Kakwani [18]) which measures
the departure from proportionality as the difference between the concentration
coefficient of tax liabilities and the Gini coefficient of before-tax income (i.e.,
the production value). For measuring the redistributive effect (RE) we use the
Reynolds-Smolensky index (Reynolds and Smolensky [26]), which equals the dif-
ference between the Gini coefficient of before-tax income (i.e., the production
value) and the concentration coefficient of after-tax income (i.e., the produc-
tion value). Therefore, the Reynolds-Smolensky index can be broken down as
follows:
[4] (RE) = ATR1−ATR (DP )
where ATR is the aggregate average tax rate and ATR1−ATR is a measure of
the incidence of the tax, i.e. total tax liabities as a fraction of post-tax income.
Building on this framework, we analyze the redistributive effects of CBIT reform
by comparing two different scenarios. In the first one, the tax rate is assumed
to be constant; in the second one, the tax rate is incremented to guarantee a
zero-cost reform.19 The baseline simulation shows a slight redistributive effect
of IRAP, more likely due to the extent of tax allowances; this redistibutive
effect is associated to a progressivity effect captured by the positive sign of the
Kakwani index. The non-neutral reform obviously reduces the tax incidence;
however, this reduction is totally due to the decrease in the average tax rate.
Indeed, we find that the CBIT reform is very regressive as shown by the negative
value of the Kakwani index. In the thrid column it is possible to observe that a
18See Monteduro and Zanardi [22].
19 It is worth noting that the Gini index of before-tax production value is not the same in
the two scenarios because we exclude the cases of firms in special regime; moreover, we do not
consider the cases of non-positive values of taxable base.
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neutral reform would increase the tax incidence too, by soaring the Reynolds-
Smolensky index. The unequivocal finding is a regressive effect of the CBIT
reform. The Lorenz Curve associated to the CBIT reform in the non-neutral
scenario, depicted in Figure 7, is strongly suggestive. We enlarge the picture in
the second half of the cumulative population in order to emphasize the regressive
impact associated to the poorer taxpayers. Figure 8 may help us to interpret
this finding. The proportion of labor cost on the taxable base is positively-
related to the amount of positive components for micro enterprises. Thus, the
deduction of labor compensation principally favors larger enterprises.
5.3 Increasing Tax Allowances in IRAP
For a final comparison, we discuss the tax reform of an increase in tax
allowances. In spite of the small cost in terms of tax revenues, we stress the idea
that such a tax reform is able to alleviate the tax burden for micro and small
enterprises. Figure 9 paradoxically suggests that the number of small firms,
which are going to become exempts after the tax reform, is higher compared
to the case of the CBIT reform. This is probably due to the fact that this
reform proposal is precisely targeted to SMEs. Nevertheless, the tax incidence
decreases and the degree of progressivity is very significant.
Figure 10 illustrates all the findings in a convincing way. Both the pro-
gressivity effect of increasing tax allowances and the regressivity effect of CBIT
are particularly evident by observing the decreasing function of the aggregate
average tax rate by classes of IRAP positive components.
6 Concluding Remarks
We explored the differences between IRAP and CBIT, which approximately
corresponds to allow the deduction of labor cost from the taxable base of IRAP.
The renewed interest in reforming corporate tax systems in the direction of the
comprehensive business income tax aims at neutralising the distortionary effect
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of the regional tax on productive activity on employment, productivity and in-
vestments of companies, by reducing tax wedge on labour. However, a potential
disadvantage of CBIT is that its narrower tax base reduces corporate tax rev-
enue, and thus requires higher tax rates to yield the same revenue. In the first
part of the paper we discussed a simple theoretical framework for analyzing tax
policy issues related to different kinds of the business taxation in a macroeco-
nomic context. More precisely, by considering a negative demand shock that
hits the economy, we found that tax distortions in the case of IRAP are more
contractionary than those caused by the presence of CBIT in the capital market.
In the second part of the paper we turned our attention on the empirical
evidences and stylized facts that concern tax revenues and redistributive effects
related to IRAP. From an empirical point of view, tax revenues and redistribu-
tive effects are more carefully analyzed. We implemented a microsimulation
model (MSM) based on a dataset of more than 150,000 incorporated firms con-
taining declared incomes in 2007. Tax rules in 2008 and 2009 are simulated in
the model. We showed that small incorporated firms are particularly harmed
by IRAP, especially when business run a loss instead of a profit. This is due to
the fact that IRAP is a business tax on value added, which does not allow for
the deduction of labor cost. For this purpose, we focused on the introduction of
a reform based on the CBIT principle. We defined two types of CBIT reform:
the first one is the revenue non-neutral reform; the latter is the revenue neutral
reform, in which we simulate the tax rate that allows the same amount of tax
revenues collected in the case of IRAP with a standard tax rate of 3.9 per cent.
We found that the CBIT is particularly costly and more able to enhance the
profitability for larger enterprises. Indeed, we demonstrated that the CBIT re-
form is very regressive, as resulted by analyzing the values of the Kakwani index,
which well captures the degree of progressivity. Overwhelmingly, it is possible
to observe that a neutral reform would increase the tax incidence by soaring
the Reynolds-Smolensky index, which is able to measure the redistributive ef-
fect. Our unequivocal finding is a regressive effect of the CBIT reform. Thus,
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we concluded that the deduction of labor compensation principally favor larger
enterprises. Furthermore, the tax design of CBIT is more regressive compared
to the IRAP, whether relevant tax allowances are explicitly targeted for SMEs.
By merging macroeconomic and microeconomic results, we may highlight an
efficiency-equity trade-off between IRAP and CBIT. It should be accounted for
reforming the local business taxation in Italy.
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Appendix A1: The Derivation of the Steady State
The stationary state of the equilibrium conditions for households is deter-
mined by the following equations:
[A1.1] δK = I
[A1.2] P = 1
[A1.3] βR = 1
[A1.4] Q = 1
[A1.5] RK
(
1− τP ) = 1
β
− (1− δ) = ρ+ δ
[A1.6] W
(
1− τP ) = v C
(1−N)
[A1.7] µ = −1

where Q is the Tobin’s Q in the steady-state; ρ is the subjective discount
rate and µ is the steady-state markup. From the firm’s maximization problem
we can yield the compensation for labor and capital in both the cases of IRAP
and CBIT:
[A1.8] R
KK
Y
=
(1−τC−τirap)
(1−τC)
α
µ
+ τ
irap
(1−τC) sI
[A1.9] WN
Y
=
(1−τC−τirap)
(1−τC)
1−α
µ
[A1.10] R
KK
Y
=
(
1−τC−τcbit
)
(1−τC)
α
µ
+
τcbitt
(1−τCt )
sI
[A1.11] WN
Y
= 1−α
µ
where sI is the share of investment on GDP. The steady state level of em-
ployment is easily computable by equalizing [A1.8] or [A1.10] with [A1.5], which
corresponds to the market clearing condition in the capital market, and [A1.9]
or [A1.11] with [A1.6], which corresponds to the market clearing condition in the
labor market. After some tedious algebra, we yield the following expressions:
[A1.12] N = AB(1−α)
v[(1−sG)µB−αδA]+AB(1−α) =⇒ in the case of IRAP
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[A1.13] N = (
1−τP )(ρ+δ)(1−α)
v[(1−sG)µ(ρ+δ)−αδ(1−τP )]+(1−τP )(ρ+δ)(1−α)
=⇒in the case of CBIT
where:
Definition 1 A = (1−τ
C−τirap)(1−τP )
(1−τC) if τ
irap = 0 −→ A = (1− τP )
Definition 2 B =
[
ρ+ δ − τirap
(1−τC) δ
(
1− τP )] if τ irap = 0 −→ B =(ρ+ δ)
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Appendix A2: The Short Run Dynamics of the
Model
We derive the equations describing the model by log-linearizing the first order
conditions, the budget constraints and the equilibrium conditions as in Galì et
al. (2007) and Dibartolomeo and Manzo (2010). Equations [A2.1]-[A2.4] are quite
easy to derive and standards in New Keynesian Models. The first one refers to
the linear approximation of Cobb-Douglas production function (sC is the share
of consumption and sI the share of investment); the second one is the aggregate
demand where gt is conveniently approximated around the steady state level of
the ratio of government spending to GDP; the capital accumulation dynamic
incorporates the capital adjustment costs; finally, the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (NKPC) remains unchanged with respect to the standard NEK models
(ω is the Calvo parameter).
[A2.1] yt = αkt−1 + (1− α)nt
[A2.2] yt = sCct + sI it + gt
[A2.3] kt = (1− δ) kt−1 + δit
[A2.4] pit = βEtpit+1 − (1−βω)(1−ω)ω µ̂t
Equations [A2.5]-[A2.6] correspond to the loglinearization around the steady-
state of the first order conditions. In each equation is described the difference
between IRAP and CBIT. Equations [A2.7] is the aggregate (Ricardian and Non-
Ricardian) labor supply, where ϕ = N1−N and N is the steady state level of
aggregate employment. Euler Equation, described in Equation [A2.8], takes into
account the dynamic of Non-Ricardian consumption, as λ is the weight of rule-
of-thumb consumers and γr = CrC =
v
1+v
1
1−N is the share of Non-Ricardian
consumption (γo = COC =
1−λγr
1−λ is the share of Ricardian consumption). The
Tobin’s Q dynamics are defined as in Galì et al. (2007).
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[A2.5] (wt − pt) = yt − nt − µ̂t − ζ τirap(1−τC−τirap) τ̂
irap
t
[A2.6] (rKt − pt) = yt − kt−1 − µ̂t − ζ
(
1−δ (1−τ
C−τirap)
(1−τC)
)
τirap
(1−τC−τirap) τ̂
irap
t +
− (1− ζ)
(
1−δ (1−τ
C−τirap)
(1−τC)
)
τcbit
(1−τC−τcbit) τ̂
cbit
t
[A2.7] (wt − pt) = ct + ϕnt
[A2.8] ct = Etct+1 − 1σ (rt − Etpit+1)− v
[
(σ−1)N
σ(1−γoN)(1−λ) +
λϕγr
1−λγr
]
∆nt+1
[A2.9] qt = 1η (it − kt−1)
[A2.10] qt = βEtqt+1 + [1− β (1− δ)]Et(rKt+1 − pt+1)− (rt − Etpit+1)
Equations [A2.11]-[A2.13] describe the policy functions as defined in Galì et al.
(2007). Conversely, the dynamic of nominal government spending shows inertia
and depends on its past value. Thereby, during a deflation period the govern-
ment spending may increase as the nominal level would remain unchanged.
[A2.11] rt = ρ+ φpipit
[A2.12] tt = φbbt + φggt
[A2.13] bt = (1 + ρ) (1− φb) bt−1 + (1 + ρ) (1− φg) gt−1
[A2.14] gt + pit = ρg (gt−1 + pit−1)
The last two equations describe the dynamics of tax revenues and dividends,
which are log-linearized around the steady state ratio on real GDP.
[A2.15] tt = τP
(−1)

[yt − µ̂t] + τC(1−τC)dt+
+ζ
{
τ irap
(1−τC)
[
yt − sIkt−1 + (1− sI) τ̂ irapt
]}
+
+(1− ζ)
{
τcbit
(1−τC)
[
yt − sIkt−1 − 1−αµ (wt − pt + nt) +
(
1− 1−α
µ
− sI
)
τ̂cbitt
]}
[A2.16] 1
(1−τC)dt = 
−1 [yt − (− 1) µ̂t] +
+ζ
{
τ irap
(1−τC)
[
yt − sIkt−1 + (1− sI) τ̂ irapt
]}
+
+(1− ζ)
{
τcbit
(1−τC)
[
yt − sIkt−1 − 1−αµ (wt − pt + nt) +
(
1− 1−α
µ
− sI
)
τ̂cbitt
]}
39
List of Tables
1 Positive Components of IRAP by Sectors: Population and Sample 42
2 Positive Components of IRAP by Regions: Population and Sample 43
3 Taxable Base of IRAP by Sectors: IRAP-MSM and DF Model . 44
4 Tax Revenues of IRAP by Sectors: IRAP-MSM and DF Model . 45
40
List of Figures
1 Impulse Response Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2 IRAP by Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Distribution of Loss and Non-Loss Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Indicator of Tax Burden by Classes of Positive Components . . . 49
5 Shares of IRAP Taxable Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6 From IRAP to CBIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7 Lorenz Curve and CBIT Concentration Curve . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8 Labor Cost - Taxable Base Ratio by Size and Classes of Positive
Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
9 Increasing Tax Allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
10 ATR by Classes of Positive Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
41
Table 1: Positive Components of IRAP by Sectors: Population and Sample
  
 
Sector Population Sample % Error 
01 - Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 22,676,279,983 22,754,939,646 0.9965 
02 - Fishing 873,644,523 862,988,856 1.0123 
03 – Mining and Quarrying of Energy Producing Materials 2,178,192,885 2,166,229,125 1.0055 
04 – Mining and Quarrying Except Energy Producing Materials 4,202,626,293 4,128,176,666 1.0180 
05 – Manufacture of Food Products; Beverages and Tobacco 92,211,559,144 92,213,206,974 1.0000 
06 – Manufacture of Textiles; Wearing Apparel; Dressing and Dyeing of Fur 63,163,611,792 63,191,221,780 0.9996 
07 – Manufacture of Leather and Leather Products 16,364,986,808 16,460,686,708 0.9942 
08 – Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products 13,932,810,289 14,027,750,191 0.9932 
09 – Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Product, Publishing and Printing 46,336,177,443 46,234,285,715 1.0022 
10 – Manufacture of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel  128,766,823,111 128,805,216,741 0.9997 
11 – Manufacture of Chemicals, Chemical Products and Man-Made Fibres 80,958,655,784 80,833,114,071 1.0016 
12 – Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products 43,356,152,756 43,253,135,141 1.0024 
13 – Manufacture of Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 39,694,091,319 39,672,875,694 1.0005 
14 – Manufacture of Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 150,543,036,134 150,618,532,481 0.9995 
15 – Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 124,077,613,392 124,070,222,769 1.0001 
16 – Manufacture of Electrical and Optical Equipment  68,860,957,572 68,813,680,147 1.0007 
17 – Manufacture of Transport Equipment 86,313,586,285 86,434,028,777 0.9986 
18 – Manufacturing n.e.c. 35,978,305,289 35,984,046,561 0.9998 
19 – Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 159,324,974,121 159,484,217,040 0.9990 
20 - Construction 185,739,666,788 185,877,343,924 0.9993 
21 – Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles, Retail Sale of 
Automotive Fuel 128,670,442,927 129,048,119,346 0.9971 
22 – Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 423,455,468,189 423,651,252,563 0.9995 
23 – Retail Sale Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of 
Personal and Household Goods 149,474,948,702 149,548,465,431 0.9995 
24 – Hotels and Restaurants 29,686,583,202 29,939,542,181 0.9916 
25 – Transports, Storage and Communication 180,665,296,852 180,671,433,273 1.0000 
26 – Financial Intermediation, Except Insurance and Pension Funding 231,672,716,073 231,617,635,831 1.0002 
27 – Insurance and Pension Funding, Except Compulsory Social Security 115,918,268,267 115,980,243,688 0.9995 
28 – Activities Auxiliary to Financial Intermediation 9,289,791,248 9,365,742,890 0.9919 
29 – Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 212,483,753,856 212,330,761,369 1.0007 
30 – Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 3,779,758,923 3,747,485,678 1.0086 
31 - Education 2,599,562,745 2,586,174,747 1.0052 
32 – Health and Social Work 20,872,150,474 20,817,048,591 1.0026 
33 – Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities 50,422,323,972 50,373,092,183 1.0010 
34 – Private Household with Employed Persons 8,128,643 14,975,896 0.5428 
35 – Not Elsewhere Classified (n.e.c.) 52,418,462 44,150,290 1.1873 
TOTAL 2,924,605,364,246 2,925,622,022,961 0.9997 
Source: Our elaboration of data from Finance Department, MEF, Italy. 
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Table 2: Positive Components of IRAP by Regions: Population and Sample
  
 
Region Population Sample % Error 
01) Valle d'Aosta 5,442,206,750 5,388,318,667 1.0100 
02) Piemonte 236,434,618,453 236,486,196,714 0.9998 
03) Lombardia 925,901,694,919 925,815,679,013 1.0001 
04) Friuli Venezia Giulia 70,760,129,188 70,634,528,430 1.0018 
05) Trentino Alto Adige 45,121,364,283 45,129,667,230 0.9998 
06) Veneto 259,131,952,596 259,128,439,415 1.0000 
07) Liguria 43,677,664,487 43,659,777,818 1.0004 
08) Emilia Romagna 268,049,639,451 268,072,315,545 0.9999 
09) Toscana 153,444,174,164 153,388,890,834 1.0004 
10) Marche 51,505,471,103 51,462,606,311 1.0008 
11) Umbria 27,195,324,305 27,204,423,529 0.9997 
12) Lazio 537,180,408,871 537,490,857,424 0.9994 
13) Abruzzo 32,606,638,400 32,740,001,270 0.9959 
14) Molise 4,559,447,032 4,746,321,654 0.9606 
15) Campania 95,018,235,134 95,331,144,351 0.9967 
16) Basilicata 9,722,625,929 9,632,109,401 1.0094 
17) Puglia 50,937,357,977 51,188,142,855 0.9951 
18) Calabria 15,565,699,100 15,787,051,327 0.9860 
19) Sicilia 62,875,967,423 62,903,333,315 0.9996 
20) Sardegna 29,474,744,681 29,432,217,858 1.0014 
TOTAL 2,924,605,364,246 2,925,622,022,961 0.9997 
Source: Our elaboration of data from Finance Department, MEF, Italy. 
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Table 3: Taxable Base of IRAP by Sectors: IRAP-MSM and DF Model
  
 
Sector Taxable Base IRAP-MSM Taxable Base DF Model % Error
01 - Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 2,326,905,134 2,237,473,000 1.04 
02 - Fishing 116,915,158 51,145,000 2.29 
03 – Mining and Quarrying of Energy Producing Materials 831,566,741 1,147,802,000 0.72 
04 – Mining and Quarrying Except Energy Producing 
Materials 862,985,397 835,008,000 1.03 
05 – Manufacture of Food Products; Beverages and 
Tobacco 9,867,997,003 9,562,477,000 1.03 
06 – Manufacture of Textiles; Wearing Apparel; Dressing 
and Dyeing of Fur 9,452,798,836 8,976,495,000 1.05 
07 – Manufacture of Leather and Leather Products 2,241,872,892 2,138,348,000 1.05 
08 – Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products 1,992,961,892 1,911,443,000 1.04 
09 – Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Product, 
Publishing and Printing 7,769,248,484 7,875,232,000 0.99 
10 – Manufacture of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and 
Nuclear Fuel  7,732,662,377 4,890,134,000 1.58 
11 – Manufacture of Chemicals, Chemical Products and 
Man-Made Fibres 11,848,948,464 10,810,823,000 1.10 
12 – Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products 6,222,028,530 6,147,136,000 1.01 
13 – Manufacture of Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 6,686,878,153 5,892,078,000 1.13 
14 – Manufacture of Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 
Products 22,769,089,395 22,579,250,000 1.01 
15 – Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 21,015,211,362 21,267,118,000 0.99 
16 – Manufacture of Electrical and Optical Equipment  12,724,844,805 12,201,997,000 1.04 
17 – Manufacture of Transport Equipment 9,827,797,356 7,066,161,000 1.39 
18 – Manufacturing n.e.c. 5,080,630,890 4,973,196,000 1.02 
19 – Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 17,707,546,572 22,923,560,000 0.77 
20 - Construction 27,933,061,193 25,942,112,000 1.08 
21 – Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles, Retail 
Sale of Automotive Fuel 7,348,260,043 6,116,982,000 1.20 
22 – Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 31,596,392,937 31,836,890,000 0.99 
23 – Retail Sale Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; 
Repair of Personal and Household Goods 14,188,941,478 14,201,542,000 1.00 
24 – Hotels and Restaurants 6,820,795,254 6,558,495,000 1.04 
25 – Transports, Storage and Communication 43,880,425,483 40,570,248,000 1.08 
26 – Financial Intermediation, Except Insurance and 
Pension Funding 51,594,686,572 62,817,858,000 0.82 
27 – Insurance and Pension Funding, Except Compulsory 
Social Security 5,762,583,961 7,661,332,000 0.75 
28 – Activities Auxiliary to Financial Intermediation 2,038,188,102 1,954,055,000 1.04 
29 – Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 50,768,543,517 46,474,069,000 1.09 
30 – Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory 
Social Security 775,817,786 815,050,000 0.95 
31 - Education 734,238,838 837,756,000 0.88 
32 – Health and Social Work 7,058,246,109 6,528,706,000 1.08 
33 – Other Community, Social and Personal Service 
Activities 11,914,872,722 12,893,377,000 0.92 
34 – Private Household with Employed Persons 6,670,429 3,586,000 1.86 
35 – Not Elsewhere Classified (n.e.c.) 16,899,988 3,845,000 4.40 
TOTAL 419,517,513,853 418,702,779,000 1.00 
Source: Our elaboration of data from Finance Department, MEF, Italy. 
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Table 4: Tax Revenues of IRAP by Sectors: IRAP-MSM and DF Model
  
 
Sector Tax Revenues IRAP-MSM Tax Revenues DF Model % Error
01 - Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 56,722,216 61,772,000 0.92 
02 - Fishing 2,848,189 1,373,000 2.07 
03 – Mining and Quarrying of Energy Producing Materials 39,219,479 54,182,000 0.72 
04 – Mining and Quarrying Except Energy Producing Materials 34,710,295 33,337,000 1.04 
05 – Manufacture of Food Products; Beverages and Tobacco 383,356,642 375,712,000 1.02 
06 – Manufacture of Textiles; Wearing Apparel; Dressing and 
Dyeing of Fur 375,133,057 357,835,000 1.05 
07 – Manufacture of Leather and Leather Products 89,898,786 86,115,000 1.04 
08 – Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products 78,793,102 74,842,000 1.05 
09 – Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Product, Publishing 
and Printing 315,945,111 319,877,000 0.99 
10 – Manufacture of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and 
Nuclear Fuel  331,512,542 212,437,000 1.56 
11 – Manufacture of Chemicals, Chemical Products and Man-
Made Fibres 478,363,295 437,205,000 1.09 
12 – Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products 247,943,892 244,996,000 1.01 
13 – Manufacture of Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 267,847,431 236,312,000 1.13 
14 – Manufacture of Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 895,117,182 895,705,000 1.00 
15 – Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 823,765,054 834,941,000 0.99 
16 – Manufacture of Electrical and Optical Equipment  508,952,202 489,974,000 1.04 
17 – Manufacture of Transport Equipment 401,613,306 290,823,000 1.38 
18 – Manufacturing n.e.c. 204,402,645 201,081,000 1.02 
19 – Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 737,897,937 976,006,000 0.76 
20 - Construction 1,131,723,288 1,058,429,000 1.07 
21 – Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles, Retail Sale 
of Automotive Fuel 301,794,229 249,888,000 1.21 
22 – Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles 1,269,535,306 1,278,681,000 0.99 
23 – Retail Sale Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; 
Repair of Personal and Household Goods 575,747,731 576,575,000 1.00 
24 – Hotels and Restaurants 280,640,078 270,705,000 1.04 
25 – Transports, Storage and Communication 1,842,051,490 1,726,504,000 1.07 
26 – Financial Intermediation, Except Insurance and Pension 
Funding 2,411,528,252 2,820,474,000 0.86 
27 – Insurance and Pension Funding, Except Compulsory Social 
Security 273,722,663 340,983,000 0.80 
28 – Activities Auxiliary to Financial Intermediation 88,897,366 88,170,000 1.01 
29 – Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 2,055,983,639 1,904,141,000 1.08 
30 – Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security 31,474,443 33,161,000 0.95 
31 - Education 26,331,051 32,512,000 0.81 
32 – Health and Social Work 240,852,223 225,445,000 1.07 
33 – Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities 484,930,757 530,838,000 0.91 
34 – Private Household with Employed Persons 48,833 79,000 0.62 
35 – Not Elsewhere Classified (n.e.c.) 651,669 167,000 3.90 
TOTAL 17,289,955,381 17,321,277,000 1.00 
Source: Our elaboration of data from Finance Department, MEF, Italy. 
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions
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Figure 2: IRAP by Regions
  
 
Region IRAP by Headquarters IRAP by Plants 
01) Valle d'Aosta 37,320,382 34,145,410
02) Piemonte 1,510,243,807 1,351,449,558
03) Lombardia 5,411,583,382 4,926,550,412
04) Friuli Venezia Giulia 323,743,844 338,616,171
05) Trentino Alto Adige 267,935,663 284,760,537
06) Veneto 1,494,936,654 1,624,072,056
07) Liguria 270,169,440 387,844,326
08) Emilia Romagna 1,623,455,659 1,648,038,219
09) Toscana 906,730,723 1,029,298,197
10) Marche 367,917,561 434,305,677
11) Umbria 135,968,724 159,007,513
12) Lazio 3,163,913,970 2,452,289,984
13) Abruzzo 233,333,888 311,286,335
14) Molise 29,181,337 50,836,991
15) Campania 620,387,831 859,086,308
16) Basilicata 46,958,175 65,610,367
17) Puglia 249,666,189 445,701,551
18) Calabria 88,021,945 142,718,145
19) Sicilia 352,481,323 532,245,581
20) Sardegna 156,004,885 212,092,116
TOTAL 17,289,955,381 17,289,955,381
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Source: Our elaboration of data from Finance Department, MEF, Italy. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Loss and Non-Loss Firms
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Source: Our elaboration of data from Finance Department, MEF, Italy. 
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Figure 4: Indicator of Tax Burden by Classes of Positive Components
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Source: Our elaboration of data from Finance Department, MEF, Italy. 
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Figure 5: Shares of IRAP Taxable Base
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Taxable Base Interest 
Expenses 
Labor Cost Deductible 
Labor Cost 
Non-
Deductible 
Labor Cost 
419,518 69,229 400,829 129,386 271,444 
Source: Our elaboration of data from Finance Department, MEF, Italy. Values in millions of euro. 
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Figure 6: From IRAP to CBIT
 
 
Redistributive Effects and Gini Index IRAP 
CBIT 
(Non-Neutral Reform) 
CBIT 
(Neutral Reform)* 
Tax Revenues (In thousands of euro) 17,289,955 9,565,207 17,289,955 
Cost of Tax Reform (In thousands of euro)  7,724,748 0 
Exempts 319,357 352,316 352,225 
Exempts Small Firms 312,812 335,720 335,629 
Production Value Before Tax .86360 .88208 .88208 
Production Value After Tax .86301 .88217 .88225 
Tax .87805 .87771 .87771 
Reynolds Smolensky Index .00050 -.00009 -.00016 
Kakwani Index .01445 -.00437 -.00437 
Gini Index 
Tax Incidence 0.0346 0.0206 0.0366 
Source: Our calculations on data from Finance Department, MEF, Italy. 
* Standard tax rate is equal to 7.05% (in place of 3.9%). 
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Figure 7: Lorenz Curve and CBIT Concentration Curve
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Figure 8: Labor Cost - Taxable Base Ratio by Size and Classes of Positive
Components
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Figure 9: Increasing Tax Allowances
 
 
Redistributive Effects and Gini Index IRAP Increasing Tax Allowances
Tax Revenues (In thousands of euro) 17,289,955 17,186,067 
Cost of Tax Reform (In thousands of euro)  103,888 
Exempts 319,357 363,911 
Exempts Small Firms 312,812 357,267 
Production Value Before Tax .86360 .85343 
Production Value After Tax .86301 .85271 
Tax .87805 .87441 
Reynolds Smolensky Index .00050 .00072 
Kakwani Index .01445 .02098 
Gini Index 
Tax Incidence 0.0346 0.0345 
Source: Our calculations on data from Finance Department, MEF, Italy. 
* Tax allowances ex art 11 c.4 bis have been doubled in the simulation. 
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Figure 10: ATR by Classes of Positive Components
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